Abstract. -The loss of the last Spanish colonial territories in America in 1898 showed the power of the United States and intensified moral discouragement in Latin nations after the French defeat in Sedan (1870). Although Spain and France shared a similar moral consequence, the solutions worked out were antagonistic and influenced the ideas about it overseas. This paper analyses the different ways this conflict was seen in Latin America, particularly through Justo Sierra and Francisco Bulnes, two of the principal figures of the Porfiriato regime.
thesis -and Alfred Thayer Mahan, who also supported the search for a new commercial, territorial and naval frontier for the United States, particularly in the Pacific and West Indies. 3 French and Spanish defeats (Sedan in 1870 and the loss of the last Spanish colonial territories in the Caribbean and the Pacific in 1898-1899) contributed to the moral discouragement and ideological collapse of their respective identities, setting up a phenomenon which was immediately shown in American countries of Spanish colonisation by means of "pan-Latin" movements of self-defence and the search for an explanation either historical or structural, or even biological, for their decline.
Both Spanish and French defeats share a similar moral consequence -the decline as fruit or seed of a serious identity crisis -although the assumptions and solutions worked out were antagonistic. Bearing in mind that Sedan can be considered as an unexpected event whereas the loss of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines was a disaster foreseen, the different ways both governments dealt with the new situation were far apart, as far as the social and political consequences were concerned. 4 In spite of the triumphant discourse maintained by the Spanish government and the government-controlled press until the conflict was over, the predictability of the defeat alleviated the pain resulting from the loss of the overseas territories. This attitude led many intellectuals to think that the situation would remain as it was since "despite hopes having been laid on a dramatic change, neither did the monarchy collapse nor were there immediate changes of the members of the government". 5 This response contrasted with what had happened in France where a republican system was established upon the ashes of the II Empire.
The weak repercussion the loss of overseas territories to the United States caused in Spanish society was more frustrating than the defeat itself. This situation implied that 1898 could not be taken as the departure point of a renovated Spain and it also confirmed the emptiness in the collective morale of the people who had healed their wounds far too quickly and that of the intellectuals who had meant to "save the country from the abyss they themselves are lying ahead".
6
From Mexico, Francisco Bulnes exonerated Spanish people from the disaster, blaming instead the myopic view of their writers who spread false ideas about the real power of United States:
"Si éstos no hubieran afirmado que los norteamericanos formaban una nación de mercachifles ebrios, sólo capaces de disparar jamones y fragmentos de tabaco masticado [...] España habría conservado Puerto Rico y Filipinas (y) hubiera recibido dos ó tres centenares de pesos por abandonar Cuba". 7 The distortion of the image of the United States (only Francisco Pi y Margall' s federalists warned of the impending threat) 8 helped Spaniards to forget what had happened quickly so that Spain did not even hold a grudge against "the enemy for a day", as José Ortega y Gasset described the United States. 9 This differs from the way the end-of-the-century conflict was seen in Latin America and particularly in Mexico.
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND NATIONAL SOLUTIONS
The measures and solutions given to the international dimension of the conflict were clearly national ones, decided in the countries directly or indirectly affected by the increasing North American power. Among other consequences of 1898, it should be pointed out that in Spain the writers assembled around the "mythical" date (as mythical and questionable as the generation itself) viewed a problem which was solved by means of nationalistic and antiscientific expositions. This attitude favoured the Spanish awakening to the twentieth century. However, physical proximity to the United States offered a sharper profile of the interests that were defined in 1898. This led the governments and intellectuals to focus on history and reality itself and to assume the civilising project, as Leopoldo Zea defined it "brainwashing and skin change", 10 to take one's own and, also quoting Zea, avoid "stop being what one has been and still is, to be something else".
11
Therefore, by the end of the century Mexican intellectuals gave up the anti Spanish idea suggested, among others, by Ignacio Ramírez and they claimed their own identity recalling the Spanish past as safeguard of spiritual values opposed to the United States model of desire for material progress. Justo Sierra wrote in 1900:
"Nuestros lectores comprenden el interés que las cosas de España nos inspiran; todo cuanto se refiere a los países latinos nos atañe; todo cuanto con su crecimiento y poder se relaciona, nos apasiona y tratándose de España, que es nuestra gran cruza sanguínea, hoy que ya ni de cerca ni de lejos puede ser un factor en la vida política de los hispanoamericanos, nuestro anhelo sube de punto".
Since positivism predominated in public opinion from 1867 until 1910, the 1898 event was analysed in Mexico concluding that weaker people or those badly adapted to the new era were bound to yield to the stronger. In 1895, the war in Cuba forced the Mexican government, afraid of an expansion of the United States in the area, to adopt a low intensity diplomacy 13 13 In an interview given by Vicente Riva Palacio to a Spanish journalist it was pointed out that "en cuanto a su personalísimo sentir [...], las palabras del general [...] parecen las del español rancio que siente y piensa como nosotros, que se agita en la atmósfera presente de odio hacia la insurrección de Cuba" but as a Mexican minister he is obliged to respect the propaganda both "españoles y filibusteros" as well as "la paz y la armonía" which presided the relationship with the 20 The supporters of the Cuban independence critized the Mexican neutrality: "risible e hipócrita neutralidad que consiste en ayudar a España volviéndole la espalda a toda la razón que Cuba posee". "Españoles y gachupines": El Imparcial (7 Jan. 1899), quoted in María Elena Rodríguez de Magis, "La revolución filipina en la prensa mexicana (1898-It should be stressed, apart from the official policy, that a section of Mexican intellectuals took advantage of the clash of interests caused by the Cuban war to find answers to their own problems through the analysis of the Spanish defeat. The resulting thesis was that of the inferiority of Latin people. In order to fight this idea the mestizo was valued as the group best adapted to American reality. 21 Its features were also used as a way of protecting the mestizo identity against the strength of United States. 22 See Charles A. Hale, "Los mitos políticos de la nación mexicana. El liberalismo y la revolución": Historia Mexicana XLVI, 4 (Mexico 1997), pp. 821-837, where he wonders how national identity and sovereignty can be preserved in the current globalization era. He cites the ideas developed by Justo Sierra in two articles on "americanismo" written for La Libertad in 1883 (22 and 27 Dec.) against the imitation of whatever arrived from the United States set forward by José Maria Vigil. 23 We are particularly interested in two of them because of their widely spread, original and too often polemical ideas: the schoolteacher Justo Sierra and the versatile engineer Francisco Bulnes. Despite being members of the "scientific movement", they shared the same ageSierra had been born in Campeche in 1848 in a well-to-do family whereas Bulnes, whose grandparents were Spanish, had been born a year earlier in the capital -and above all independence of criterion to analyse the reality of their time. They both understood better than any of their contemporaries the scope of the North American-Spanish conflict in 1898 and wrote about the way the power of the United States would affect Mexico and the rest of the continent. Francisco Bulnes, renowned for his great learning in the different fields of knowledge and celebrated for his witty and categorical statements, was chief editor of La Libertad and editor in El siglo XX, Mexico Financiero and La Prensa. He published in 1899 his well-known work with the explicit title El porvenir de las naciones latinoamericanas ante las recientes conquistas de Europa y Norteamérica (estructura y evolución de un continente). Not only did he describe an amazing theory of humankind being divided into three different races defined by their traditional diet of wheat, rice or corn but he also analysed the reasons for Spanish defeat and supported the Monroe doctrine as the only way to prevent European expansion in America. Bulnes was blunt with the ex-metropolis, where "sound and intelligent patriotism advised avoidance of the war and the acknowledgement of what had already been lost, Cuba". 31 Just like any conquering nation, Spain was bound "to suffer more humiliations than she has caused" since there had been established a system of "parasitism of the metropolis, maintained by means of injustices and scaffolds".
32
Bulnes devoted a chapter to the two dangers that lay in wait for American territory. One of them "authentic", real, coming from Europe which was being solved with the application of the Monroe doctrine.
"Si la América Latina es aún independiente y puede serlo indefinidamente ante la exasperante expansión de Europa, lo debe a la doctrina Monroe [...] La alianza anglosajona es actualmente un hecho científico, preciso, inexpugnable, inviolable, que se impone a los mismos aliados y que impone al mundo entero". 33 The "potential" danger to be aware of were the United States though Bulnes seemed rather sceptical of a military invasion of a country with no need for more land and no need to spread any religious belief. On the other side, Justo Sierra considered the granting to North American Baptist missionaries of the teacher training colleges in Coahuila a dangerous form of "cultural Americanism" and advocated the "preservation of the Latin spirit of our nationality". 35 Bulnes neutralised any threat from United States since he could not help admiring the model of justice and progress they represented, which was shared by many American thinkers at that moment. The treaty signed in Paris which ended the Spanish-North American war, led him to exclaim that "among all nations, the United States, not having reached perfection in the sense of justice, are placed in the highest moral level of our present civilisation". 36 In the final conclusion in his analysis he foresaw a "sad" future for most Latin American nations, with no other choice but "barbarism fostered by misery and civil war". 37 Mexico, however, could find a way out if, among other things, it promoted immigration to give rise to "a democratic agriculture".
38
In a more thorough analysis than Bulnes's, Justo Sierra often wrote about Spain, the legacy to America and the relevance of the United States for the future of the continent. All his works were carried out from the understanding of historical processes though not without censure and calls to preserve one's own but not ignoring other people's progress. In 1892, during the commemoration of the Discovery of America, Sierra stated his affection for Spain as the mother of the other America and standard bearer of the Latin "race" 39 and expressed a certain mistrust of the United States:
"Lo que deseamos de veras los mexicanos en todo esto, es que nuestros primos no tengan ni la oportunidad ni la necesidad de convertirse en potencia guerrera: agricultores, comerciantes, industriales, estos son los vecinos que nos convienen". 40 Sierra, who was a man of conciliatory nature, lamented José Martí's death, a friend of his since the Cuban leader visited Mexico for the first "para ella (España) la insurrección de Cuba es el problema de hoy: ¿no es para nosotros el problema de mañana? [...] Cuba, separada por la fuerza de su propia conexión con España e incapaz de mantenerse por si sola, no puede dejar de gravitar hacia la Unión Americana y ésta, según la misma ley natural, no puede expelerla de su seno. Desde entonces los que observamos, perfectamente escépticos frente a las frases y terriblemente inquietos frente a los síntomas, la actitud en apariencia divergente del pueblo y el gobierno angloamericano, no podemos dejar de comprender hacia cuál constelación se dirige la estrella solitaria, ni nos es permitido no prever que clausurado así el golfo mexicano, son muy probables nuestro vasallaje mercantil y nuestra dependencia económica".
42
Once the conflict was over and the treaty of Paris signed, Sierra started to worry about matters related to the internal organisation of Cuba and above all the achievement of the independence promised by the United States. He had already stated his ideas about the precarious situation of independence connected with the Philippines conflict where "the freedom of the fearless ones" had to face the independence of the powerful, who unfortunately destroyed that "freedom of the small ones". Sierra hoped that during the organisational period of the new society life could be lived with absolute freedom since, as he wrote in June 1899, "so far the Americans are becoming so similar to the Spaniards as far as repression is concerned [that] we would like to feel the differences during the organisational period". 43 In the same way, he linked the future of Cuba to that of Mexico, very much interested as he was in the pacification of the island, because "Latin people pushed towards peace find the track to prosperity and long term freedom arrives in the guard's van".
